A major achievement of mechanism design theory is the family of truthful mechanisms often called VCG (named after Vickrey, Clarke and Groves). Although these mechanisms have many appealing properties, their essential intractability prevents them from being applied to complex problems like combinatorial auctions. In particular, VCG mechanisms require the agents to fully describe their valuation functions to the mechanism. Such a description may require exponential size and thus be infeasible for the agents.
INTRODUCTION

Motivation
The theory of mechanism design may be described as studying the design of protocols under the assumption that the participants behave according to their own goals and preferences and not necessarily as instructed by the protocol. The canonical mechanism design problem can be described as follows: A set of rational agents need to collaboratively choose an outcome o from a finite set O of possibilities. Each agent i has a privately known valuation function v i : O → R quantifying the agent's benefit from each possible outcome. The agents are supposed to report their valuation functions v i (·) to some centralized mechanism that chooses an outcome o that maximizes the total welfare i v i (o). The main difficulty is that agents may choose not to reveal their true valuations but rather report carefully designed lies in an attempt to influence the outcome to their liking. The tool that the mechanism uses to motivate the agents to reveal the truth is monetary payments. These payments are to be designed in a way that ensures that rational agents always reveal their true valuations -making the mechanism, so called, incentive compatible or truthful. To date there is only one general technique known for designing such a payment structure, sometimes called the generalized Vickrey auction [21] , the Clarke pivot rule [1] the Groves mechanism [5] , or, as we will, VCG. In certain senses this payment structure is unique [4, 17] .
Although VCG mechanisms have many appealing properties, their intractibility prevents them from being applied to complex problems like combinatorial auctions. This intractability is twofold: Firstly, VCG mechanisms require the agents to fully describe their valuation functions. Secondly, it requires the mechanism to find the optimal allocation.
The problem of combinatorial auctions (CA) is an important example of a mechanism design problem. In CA, the designer would like to auction a set S of items (e.g. radio spectra licenses) among a group of agents who desire them. As items may be substitutes (e.g. two licenses in the same place) or complementary (e.g. licenses in two neighboring states) the valuation of each agent may have a complex structure. A formal definition of the problem can be found in section 2.1.
Consider a VCG mechanism for CA: The mechanism first asks each agent to declare her valuation function, i.e. to report a function w i : 2 S → R+. It then computes the optimal allocation and the payments of each agent.
Such a mechanism is clearly intractable. Firstly, finding the optimal allocation is NP-hard even to approximate. Secondly, the mechanism relies on the agents' ability to describe their valuations in a way which is succinct to its allocation algorithm. This ability cannot be taken for granted. For example a naive solution will require each agent to report a vector of 2 |S| − 1 numbers to the mechanism. This of course is not feasible unless the number of items is very small. On the other extreme the designer can ask the agents to submit oracles, i.e. programs that return for every set s their valuation v i (s). However, it is not difficult to see that in order to find the optimal allocation or even a reasonable one, the allocation algorithm must query these oracles an exponential number of times. The natural solution for this problem is to introduce the notion of a bidding language. Such a language should enable the agents to efficiently represent or at least to approximate their valuations, but should also allow the allocation algorithm to compute the desired allocation in polynomial time. Hopefully such a language will capture most "real life" valuations. Various bidding languages were proposed in recent years. The interested reader is pointed to [11] .
The drawback of this approach is that there are always valuation functions which are impossible to represent in polynomial-time. We therefore call such languages incomplete. Since VCG mechanisms with incomplete languages are not optimal, the impossibility results of [13] imply that they cannot be truthful! In other words, instead of describing their true valuation according to the designer's instructions, agents may have incentive to misreport. Therefore, there is no guarantee, even when the agents are rational, that the mechanism will find a reasonable allocation. Moreover, such mechanisms do not even guarantee individual rationality. That is, there are cases where truthful agents will pay for their allocated sets more than their actual valuations for them.
Our goal in this paper is to prevent these phenomena.
This work
This paper proposes a general method for overcoming the non truthfulness of VCG mechanisms with incomplete languages. We first introduce the notions of oracles 1 , descriptions and consistency checkers in the context of VCG mechanisms. Oracles are programs that represent the agents' valuations. They are used by the mechanism to measure the agents' welfare. A consistency checker is a function that checks whether an agent's description, which is given in the intermediate language, is consistent with her oracle. These additions to the VCG method still do not suffice to guarantee its truthfulness.
We then describe three mechanisms which guarantee that under reasonable assumptions, truth-telling is the rational strategy for the agents. Each mechanism is more powerful but also more time consuming than its predecessor. All of our mechanisms have polynomial computational time.
Following [13] we adopt the concept of feasibly dominant actions (FDAs). Informally speaking, we assume that the agents choose their actions (strategies) according to their strategic knowledge. We say that an action is feasibly domiant if the agent is not aware of any circumstances where another strategy is better for her. It was argued in [13] that when feasibly dominant actions are available for the agent, it is irrational for her not to choose one of them. It was also shown in [13] that if the payment of a non-optimal mechanism is calculated according to the VCG formula, the existence of FDAs must rely on further assumptions on the agent's knowledge. Our mechanisms guarantee that, under such reasonable assumptions, truth-telling is indeed an FDA. Each of them handles a more general form of knowledge than its predecessor (i.e. more sophisticated agents).
When the agents are truthful, the result of our mechanisms is at least as good as the result of the allocation algorithm on the truthfully reported descriptions. Our mechanisms also satisfy individual rationality. 1 Some advantages of using oracles were discussed in [19] Note that our method does not make any assumptions on the algorithm or the bidding language. The designer needs to design an intermediate language, a consistency checker and an allocation algorithm such that, when the agents prepare their descriptions according to her instructions, the overall result is good. She then gets the mechanism for free.
For simplicity we prove all our theorems directly for the combinatorial auction problem. Our results however are much more general and can be applied to any VCG, weighted VCG or compensation and bonus [14] mechanism.
Related work
Non optimal VCG mechanisms were first studied in [13] . This paper discusses VCG mechanisms where the optimal algorithm is replaced by a poly-time approximation or heuristic. This paper shows that mechanisms constructed this way cannot be truthful. It then proposes a general way of dealing with this non-truthfulness using a certain form of appeal functions.
The problem of combinatorial auctions has been studied by several researchers in recent years. A comprehensive survey of various aspects of this problem can be found in [2] . In particular, various bidding languages [3, 7, 20] and restrictions on the classes of bids that can be submitted (e.g. [6] ) were proposed. A comparative study of some of these languages can be found in [11] .
An alternative approach to the one that is taken here is to consider mechanisms where the agents are not required to declare their valuation functions (non-revelation mechanisms). Examples of such mechanisms are the simultaneous ascending auction [10] and iBundle [16] . The efficiency of these auctions however is dependent on strong assumptions on the agents' behaviour. They are also specifically designed to address the combinatorial auction problem.
Finally, there is an extensive literature in the field of mechanism design. An introduction can be found in [8, chapter 23] and [15, chapter 10] Organization of this paper: The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 formally defines combinatorial auctions and VCG mechanisms for CA and explains their intractability. Section 3 provides an example of a VCG mechanism with incomplete language and demonstrates the drawbacks of such mechanisms. Section 4 defines our most basic mechanism, describes the main concepts of [13] and shows that under reasonable assumptions on the agents' knowledge, truth-telling is an FDA. Sections 4 to 6 define extended versions of this mechanism and prove their basic properties. Section 7 discusses additional implementation issues and section 8 concludes the paper.
A full version of this paper is available at [18] .
PRELIMINARIES
Combinatorial auctions (CA)
The problem of combinatorial auctions (CA) has been extensively studied in recent years (see e.g. [7] [20] [3] [6] [11] ). The importance of this problem is twofold. Firstly, several important applications rely on it (e.g. the FCC auction [9] ). Secondly, it is a generalization of many other problems of interest, in particular in the field of electronic commerce. A recent survey of various aspects of this problem can be found in [2] . For simplicity we prove all our theorems directly for this problem. 
Free disposal Items have non-negative values. I.e if s
Note that the problem allows items to be complemen-
For example an agent may be willing to pay $200 for a TV set, $150 for a VCR, $450 for both and only $200 for two VCRs. The structure of the valuation functions might therefore be complex. The problem of finding an optimal allocation is equivalent to set-packing and is NP -hard even to approximate within any reasonable factor.
Note that the valuation functions are not known to the mechanism in advance. Moreover, if the mechanism is not carefully designed, the agents will have an incentive to manipulate it for their own self interest. Such manipulations might severely damage the efficiency of the mechanism. In mechanism design problems the agents are assumed to be rational in a game theoretic sense. They choose strategies which are good for them and not necessarily act as instructed. The goal of the designer is to design a mechanism (protocol) that produces good results under this assumption. Comprehensive surveys of mechanism design theory can be found in [15, chapter 10] In order to handle complex problems like combinatorial auctions the mechanism needs to address the following issues:
• Agents' valuations might be complex to express.
2 This is called the quasi-linearity assumption.
• The allocation and payments might be hard to compute.
• The mechanism needs to be designed to find good allocations even though the agents follow their own self interest.
Let us summarize our notations and terminology regarding this problem. 
Notations
. . , a n ).
VCG mechanisms for CA
One of the major achievements of mechanism design theory is the VCG method for constructing truthful mechanisms. In this subsection we briefly describe these mechanisms for CA and discuss some of their properties.
The simplest kind of mechanisms are protocols (called revelation mechanisms) where the agents are simply required to (privately) report their types to the mechanism. According to these declarations the mechanism computes the allocation and the payments. Note that agents may lie if it is beneficial for them. Such a mechanism can be denoted by a pair m = (k(w), p(w)) where k denotes the allocation function, p the payment function and w the agents' declaration .
Definition 1. (truthful mechanism) A revelation mechanism is called truthful if truth-telling is a dominant strategy for all agents. I.e. if lying to the mechanism can never be more beneficial than declaring v
i .
VCG mechanism are a special kind of revelation mechanisms.
Definition 2. (VCG mechanism)
A VCG mechanism for CA is a revelation mechanism m = (k(w), p(w)) such that:
• The mechanism chooses an allocation s = k(w) that maximizes the total welfare gs(w) = i w i (s) according to the declaration w.
• The payment is calculated according to the VCG formula:
Proof. Assume by contradiction that the mechanism is not truthful. Then there exists an agent i of type v i , a type declaration w −i for the other agents, and
denote the chosen allocation when the agent is truthful and let s
= k((w i , w −i )). The above inequality implies that gs((v i , w −i )) < g s ((v i , w −i )).
This contradicts the optimality of k(.).
Rational agents will therefore reveal their true type to the mechanism. Thus, when agents are rational the mechanism will result in the optimal allocation! Note that the main trick of this method is to identify the utility of truthful agents with the declared total welfare. Similar techniques were introduced in [14] for handling different type of problems. The results presented here are applicable to their methods as well.
Another desirable property of mechanisms is called individual rationality. This means that the utility of a truthful agent is guaranteed to be non-negative. A special kind of VCG mechanism called Clarke's mechanism [1] can guarantee this property. It also guarantees that the payment of agents who are not allocated any object is zero. It does so by setting
) denotes the result of the algorithm when agent i is "ignored". Until section 7 we shall only be interested in truthfulness. Thus, for simplicity we can assume that h i (w −i ) ≡ 0. It is worth notifying that weighted VCG mechanisms are possible as well (see e.g. [17] [14] ). Also the designer can impose her own preferences by "pretending" to be one of the agents. To date VCG is the only general known method for the construction of truthful mechanisms. There is also some evidence [17] that other methods are generally impossible.
The intractability of VCG mechanisms
Although VCG mechanisms have many desirable properties, their essential intractability prevents them from being used for complex problems like CA. This intractability is twofold: VCG mechanisms require the agents to fully describe their valuation functions and require the mechanism to find optimal allocations.
The second aspect has been extensively discussed in [13] . This paper discusses VCG mechanisms where the optimal algorithm is replaced by a poly-time approximation or heuristics. It shows that mechanisms which are constructed in this way cannot be truthful. The paper proposes a method to overcome this non-truthfulness. It suggests a bounded rationality variant of truthfulness called feasible truthfulness and shows that under reasonable assumptions there is a general way of constructing poly-time feasible truthful mechanisms.
An even more fundamental obstacle on the way to the application of VCG mechanisms (and revelation mechanisms in general) to complex problems is the fact that the agents are required to describe their valuation functions to the mechanism. Consider for example a VCG mechanism for CA. One natural way in which an agent can describe her valuation function to the mechanism is by reporting a vector of numbers denoting her valuation for every possible combination of items. This however is infeasible unless the number of items is very small as it will require a vector of size 2 |S| − 1. On the other extreme, the designer can ask the agent to construct an oracle, i.e. a program that returns for every set s the agent's valuation v i (s). However it is not difficult to see that in order to find the best allocation or even a reasonable one, the algorithm needs to query the oracle an exponential number of times.
The natural solution for this problem is to introduce the notion of a bidding language (see e.g. [11] ) -a language that will enable agents to efficiently represent or at least approximate their valuations but will also allow the mechanism's algorithm to compute the desired allocation in polynomial time. Hopefully such a language will capture most "real life" valuations. In addition the designer must provide the agents with instructions of how to construct these descriptions from their actual valuations. Given such a language L we can define VCG mechanisms as before. The bidding language and allocation algorithm must be constructed in a way that when the agents follow the designer's instructions, the results will be good (heuristically, within a certain factor from the optimum etc.)
The problem with this approach is that there are always valuation functions which are impossible to represent in polynomialtime. We therefore call such languages incomplete. As such a mechanism is not optimal, the impossibility results in [13] imply that VCG mechanisms with incomplete languages cannot be truthful! In other words, agents may have incentives not to follow the designer's instructions. Therefore there is no guarantee, even when the agents are rational, that the overall results will be good. Moreover, such mechanisms do not even guarantee individual rationality. That is, there are cases where truthful agents will pay for their allocated sets more than their actual valuations for them.
In this paper we propose a general method for overcoming this non-truthfulness. Our solution is in the same spirit of [13] . However several additional steps are needed to guarantee the good game theoretical properties of the resulting mechanisms.
EXAMPLE VCG WITH OR BIDS
In this section we describe a simple example for a VCG mechanism with an incomplete bidding language. We shall use this example throughout the paper. We first describe the language and the mechanism. Then we analyze what strategies rational agents might choose when participating in it. Note that our language is less expressive than what we expect from real life mechanisms. We will demonstrate that even with such a language it is possible to construct mechanisms where truth-telling is the rational strategy.
Following [11] we define an atomic bid to be a pair (s, p) where s ⊆ S is a set of items and p is a price. The semantic of such a bid is "my maximum willingness to pay for s is p". A description in this language consists of a polynomial number of such pairs. Given such a description (sj, pj) we can define, for every set s, the price ps to be the maximal 3 sum of pjs such that sj ⊆ s are disjointed: max{ j pj|(sj ⊆ s) and ∀j = k, sj s k = φ}. This so called OR language was used in [20] . The OR language therefore assumes that if an agent is willing to pay up to PA for item A and PB for item B, then she is willing to pay at least (PA + PB) for both.
Consider now the following (toy) example of a VCG mechanism: There are only two items A and B. As shown in figure 3 , the type of Agent1 is (1, 1, 1.25 ) and of Agent2 is (0.8, 0.8, 1.2).
Suppose that the designer instructs the agents to submit their true valuation for every singleton. In this case we can define a description d i = {(sj, pj)} as truthful if for every item j, pj = v i ({j}). In other words, such a description was prepared according to the designer's instructions. Consider a VCG mechanism with this language. After the descriptions are reported, the mechanism allocates the items optimaly (according to the descriptions but not to the actual allocations!). It then calculates the payments according to the VCG formula. We assume that the designer has a small reserved price for each item, so objects which are not desired by the agents are not allocated.
In the example, when both agents are truthful, the mechanism will assign the valuation in brackets to the set AB (see figure 3) . The mechanism in this case will allocate both items to Agent1 resulting in a utility of u i = 1.25 for each agent (recall that we assume the simplified form where h i ≡ 0). The optimal allocation will allocate to each agent one item, resulting in a welfare of 1.8.
The above mechanism is not truthful. For example if Agent1 "gives up" item B and declares (1, 0, 1.25) while Agent2's declaration remains the same, it will cause the algorithm to produce the optimal result and therefore will increase Agent1's utility to 1.8! The same is true for Agent2. On the other hand if both agents are "giving up" the same item, only one item will be allocated (to Agent1). This will result in a welfare of only 1.0. We shall call a declaration where the agent reports a 0 value on one of the items singleton concession. Another reasonable strategy for an agents is to find a description which will bring the mechanism's interpretation as close as possible to her actual valuation. Formally we define the l∞-approximation of v i (.) to be the description that minimizes maxs |v
. Such a description for Agent1 is {2/3, 2/3, 4/3} . Note that the worthwhileness of such declarations is highly dependent on the declarations of the others. There are cases where such declarations will considerably improve the result of the algorithm and therefore will increase the agent's utility. On the other hand there are many cases where such designated "lies" will severely damage the total welfare and henceforth the agent's utility.
Note that the Clarke version of the above mechanism does not satisfy individual rationality. For example, if both agents are truthful, Agent1 gets both items, but pays 1.6, thereby loosing 0.35.
In this paper we will try to prevent these bad phenomena from happening.
MECHANISM1
In this section we describe our first and most basic mechanism. We first describe the building blocks of the mechanism -oracles, descriptions and consistency checkers. Then we define the mechanism and formulate its basic properties. Finally we show that under reasonable assumptions truthtelling is the rational strategy for the agents.
We start with a formal definition adopted from [13] of computationally bounded algorithms 5 .
Definition 3. (algorithm of degree d) Let n denote the number of agents. We say that a function F is of degree d if its running time is bounded by some polynomial of degree d of n.
Our mechanism fixes a constant c = O(n d ) and terminates each function that runs more than c time units (see section 7 for more details).
Oracles and valid descriptions
All the mechanisms described in this paper ask the agents to prepare oracles that represent their valuation functions. These oracles are queried by the mechanisms in order to measure the total welfare. Formally:
We shall assume that agents are capable of preparing such oracles 6 . We also assume that all the oracles are of degree d.
As mentioned earlier, it is hard for allocation algorithms to work with oracles. We assume that the allocation algorithm accepts as input descriptions in some bidding language (e.g. the OR language) and ask the agents to prepare such descriptions. A consistency checker verifies that the agents' descriptions are consistent with their oracles.
Definition 5. (valid description) A consistency checker is a function ψ(w, d) such that:
• ψ(w, d) gets an oracle w and a description d in the bidding language and returns a "corrected" oracle w .
• for every oracle w there exists at least one description d such that w = ψ(w, d). Such "fixpoint" descriptions are called valid.
Semantically, a valid description was prepared according to the designer's instructions. Since the mechanism can always use the "corrected" oracle w we shall assume that agents' descriptions are valid. We also assume that a consistency checker of degree d is available to the designer and that given a declaration d, the designer can compute an oracle w d such that d is a valid description of w d . We say that an agent's description is truthful if it is a valid description of a truthful oracle.
In the OR language for example we can define w (s) = p for every atomic bid (s, p) in the description. Creating an oracle w from a description d such that d is valid is straight forward.
Appeal functions
Another basic building block of our mechanism is the notion of appeal functions. This is a modification of the appeals that were introduced in [13] . Intuitively an appeal function lets an agent incorporate her own knowledge 5 There are several alternative definitions. This one simplifies the formalization of the results. 6 The tools which must be provided by the designer in order to make this assumption realistic are not discussed in this paper.
about the algorithm into the mechanism. The idea is that instead of declaring a falsified type, the agent can follow the designer's instructions and ask the mechanism to check whether the false description would have lead to better results. The mechanism will then choose the better of these two possibilities leveraging both the agent's utility and the total welfare. We assume that all appeal functions are of degree d for some reasonable value of d. In section 7 we will discuss ways to enforce such a limit.
In our OR example (section 3) an appeal for Agent1 might try to give up one of the items (i.e. perform a singleton concession) or try to give up item A for herself and B for Agent2 etc.
The actual implementation of the appeal functions is discussed in subsection 7.
Mechanism1
We can now define our first mechanism.
Definition 7. (mechanism1) Given an allocation algorithm k(d), and a consistency checker for the bidding language we define mechanism1 as follows:
Each agent submits to the mechanism:
• An oracle w i (.).
• A (valid) description d i .
• An appeal function l i (.).
Let w
= (w 1 , . . . , w n ), d = (d 1 , . . . , d n ). The mecha- nism computes the allocations k(d), k(l 1 (w, d)), . . . , k(l n (w, d
)) and chooses among these allocations the one that maximizes the total welfare (according to w!).
In other words, the mechanism tries all the appeals and chooses the one that yields the best result.
Letŝ denote the chosen allocation. The mechanism
calculates the payments according to the VCG formula:
) can be any real function).
Note that h i (.) is independent of agent i. Until section 7 we simply assume that it is always zero. Note also that we do not require the allocation algorithm k(.) to be optimal. It can be any polynomial time approximation or heuristic.
An action (strategy) in mechanism1 is a triplet (w i , d i , l i ). We say that such an action is truthful if w i is truthful. The following two observations are key properties of the mechanism: Letŝ denote the chosen allocation. Letṽ = (v i , w −i ). Since we assume that h i () = 0, the utility of agent i equals gŝ(ṽ) -the total welfare when the allocation isŝ and the type isṽ . Lying to the mechanism, i.e. submitting an oracle w i = v i , is thus beneficial for the agent only if it causes the mechanism to compute a better result (relatively toṽ). (For a more comprehensive discussion see [13] .) Note that when an agent lies to the mechanism, she may not only cause damage to the algorithm's result, but may also cause the mechanism to prefer the wrong allocation on the second stage. Thus, an agent needs to have a good reason for lying to the mechanism.
We will show that under reasonable assumptions on the agents, truth-telling is the rational strategy for the agents. Thus, when the agents are rational, the result of the mechanism is at least as good as the result of the allocation algorithm on the truthful descriptions.
An example
Consider the OR example of section 3. Suppose that Agent1 notices that usually the result of the algorithm improves when she is giving up item A. In a VCG mechanism the agent may be tempted to misreport in order to increase the total welfare and henceforth her own utility. In many cases however this will cause damage to the overall welfare and henceforth to Agent1. In our mechanism Agent1 can, instead of lying, declare her true type to the mechanism and ask it to check whether such a lie would have been helpful. If so, it prefers the result that was obtained by "lying". Otherwise, the mechanism prefers the result of the algorithm on the truthful description and thus prevents the damage that would have been caused by the lie. This form of appeal functions provides the agents with a lot of power. Suppose, for example, that Agent1 notices that the result improves if she gives up item A while Agent2 is giving up item B. As before, the agent can ask the mechanism to check whether such a transformation of the input would have improve the overall result.
We note that not every knowledge of the agent about the allocation algorithm k(.) can be exploited in this mechanism. Suppose that Agent1 notices that when both agents submit l∞-approximations of their valuations the overall result improves. However, as she is given an oracle for v 2 , she cannot compute Agent2's approximation as it requires her to query the oracle for every possible subset. Therefore, she cannot exploit her knowledge about the algorithm. Such phenomena is problematic and do not occur in the setting of [13] .
When is it rational to tell the truth to the mechanism?
It was shown in [13] that even with full descriptions available, non-optimal VCG mechanisms cannot be truthful (unless they produce unreasonable results). That paper introduces a bounded rationality variant of the concept of dominant strategies called feasible dominance and shows that under reasonable assumptions truth-telling is feasibly dominant for the agents. This paper follows this pattern. In this section we first describe the basic concepts of [13] . We then consider mechanism1 and analyze the conditions under which truth-telling is feasibly dominant for the agents.
Feasibly dominant actions (FDAs)
In this section we briefly describe the main concepts of [13] . The reader is referred to this paper for a more comprehensive discussion.
Notations:
We denote the action (strategy) space of agent i by A i . Given a tuple a = (a 1 , . . . , a n ) of actions chosen by the agents, we denote the utility of agent i by u i (a). In mechanism1 an action for the agent is a triplet (w i , d i , l i ). In classical game theory, given the actions of the other agents a −i , the agent is (implicitly) assumed to be capable of responding by the optimal a i . As the action space is typically very complex, this assumption is not natural in many real-life situations. The concept of feasibly dominant actions re-formulates the concept of dominant actions under the assumption that the agent has only a limited capability of computing her response. It is meant to be used in the context of revelation games.
Definition 8. (strategic knowledge) Strategic knowledge (or response function) of agent i is a partial function
Knowledge is a function by which the agent describes (for herself!) how she would like to respond to any given situation. The semantics of 
In other words, other actions may be better against a It was argued in [13] that if an agent has feasibly dominant actions available, then it is irrational not to choose one of them.
When is it rational to tell the truth to the mechanism?
Recall that the overall utility of each agent i equals gŝ(ṽ) whereŝ denotes the chosen allocation andṽ = (v i , w −i ). It is not difficult to see that when the agent declares a falsified valuation, there are cases where she will consequently lose. The agent needs therefore a good reason for lying to the mechanism. When the appeals of the agents are time-limited (i.e. of degree d) it was shown in [13] A declaration based knowledge naturally defines an appeal function which we also denote by
Proof. Letŝ denote the chosen allocation. Letṽ = (v i , w −i ). Recall that the utility of agent i equals gŝ(ṽ). Also let φ denote the empty appeal. Assume by contradiction that there exists a
that contradicts the agent's knowledge. Note that the appeals of the other agents can be assumed empty and also that it must be that Proof. Define an appeal l i as follows. Given ( The semantics of declaration based knowledge is the same as declaration based except that the agent also submits an appeal l i . Agents who are not capable of reasoning about others' appeals or do not want to count on them would have appeal independent knowledge. We argue that this would be the most common case. In all of the examples of section 4.4 the agents' knowledge was appeal independent.
MECHANISM2: MOVING INFORMATION AROUND
We now show that submitting 
. Therefore l i s result must be at least as good as the result of the mechanism in this case -a contradiction.
MECHANISM3: ADDING META-APPEALS
In section 5 we assumed that the agents' appeals are monotonic. Our final step is to get rid of this assumption. We do so by adding another layer of appeals. Due to lack of space we omit this section. For details, please see the full version of this paper [18] .
OTHER IMPLEMENTATION ISSUES
In this section we address two additional issues which a designer may face when implementing our mechanisms: guaranteeing individual rationality and forcing reasonable time limitations on the agents. For details, please see the full version of this paper [18] .
CONCLUSIONS AND FURTHER RESEARCH
In this paper we propose a general way to overcome the deficiencies of VCG mechanisms with incomplete languages. Given an intermediate language, a consistency checker, and an algorithm for the computation of the outcomes (e.g. allocations) we construct three mechanisms, each more powerful but also more time-consuming than its predecessor. All our mechanisms have polynomial computational time and satisfy individual rationality.
We adopt the strong concept of feasible dominant strategies of [13] which is a bounded rationality version of dominant strategies and showed that under reasonable assumptions on the agents' knowledge, truth-telling is feasibly dominant for the agents. In addition when an agent lies to the mechanism, there are cases where she will consequently lose.
When the agents are truth-telling the results of our mechanisms are at least as good as the mechanisms' algorithm. Our methods are general and can be applied to any VCG , weighted VCG or compensation and bonus [14] mechanism.
The paper assumes that in practice, agents will have only limited knowledge and thus will not be able to do better than their truthful FDAs. This thesis can and should be checked by experiments with "real" agents. On the other hand we feel that this assumption will remain true even when severe time limitations are forced on the agents. In fact it will not even be a surprise if in a VCG mechanism, if the bidding language and the allocation algorithm are reasonably designed, the agents will not be able to do better than truth-telling! This too can be checked experimentally.
Very little is currently known about the revenue of mechanisms for complex problems. In particular note that when a non-optimal VCG mechanism is naively used for a combinatorial auction, there are cases where the mechanism must pay to the agents instead of vice-versa! In our constructions, there are several tools that the designer must provide to the agents. Tools to construct oracles, descriptions, appeals etc. Methods for providing such tools were not discussed in this paper and are crucial for the success of our mechanisms. While at a first glance our mechanisms may seem to put a lot of burden on the agents, we argue that with the right tools provided, they can become even more "agent friendly" than non-revelation mechanisms.
This paper focuses on VCG (and compensation and bonus) mechanisms. However the problems addressed here are not unique to these mechanisms. In fact most existing solutions in the mechanism design literature rely on the agents' ability to describe their valuations. Moreover, the basic idea of equalizing the utility of the well behaved agents with the designer's goal, is the main principle behind most positive results in mechanisms design. Thus, the tools and intuitions that were developed here, may apply to other general mechanisms as well.
Finally we note that it might be fruitful to explore the possibility of using appeal functions in situations where the agents have budget limits. When such limits exist, agents may have incentives to cause others to run out of budget and it is not likely that dominant strategy mechanisms exist. One natural way to deal with budget limits, is to truncate the agent's valuation to her limit and then use VCG [12] . Truth-telling in such a mechanism is a safe strategy for the agent as she never pays more than her budget. We believe that adding certain forms of appeal functions to such mechanisms can give the agents the opportunity to retaliate against out of budget strategies, making the resulting mechanisms "more truthful".
